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Abstract
Successful application of concurrent development processes
(concurrent engineering) requires tight coordination. To speed
development, tasks often proceed in parallel by relying on pre-
liminary information from other tasks, information that has not
yet been finalized. This frequently causes substantial rework
using as much as 50% of total engineering capacity. Previous
studies have either described coordination as a complex social
process, or have focused on the frequency, but not the content,
of information exchanges. Through extensive fieldwork in a
high-end German automotive manufacturer, we develop a
framework of preliminary information that distinguishes infor-
mation precision and information stability. Information preci-
sion refers to the accuracy of the information exchanged. In-
formation stability defines the likelihood of changing a piece of
information later in the process.
This definition of preliminary information allows us to de-
velop a time-dependent model for managing interdependent
tasks, producing two alternative strategies: iterative and set-
based coordination. We discuss the trade-offs in choosing a
coordination strategy and how they change over time. This al-
lows an organization to match its problem-solving strategy with
the interdependence it faces. Set-based coordination requires an
absence of ambiguity, and should be emphasized if either star-
vation costs or the cost of pursuing multiple design alternatives
in parallel are low. Iterative coordination should be emphasized
if the downstream task faces ambiguity, or if starvation costs
are high and iteration (rework) costs are low.
(Preliminary Information; Concurrent Engineering; Communication; Co-
ordination; Problem-Solving Strategies; Product Development; Informa-
tion Processing)
Introduction
Concurrent engineering, the practice of executing cou-
pled development activities in parallel, has become the
common mode of product development as time-to-market
has gained in importance over the last 15 years (Takeuchi
and Nonaka 1986, Wheelwright and Clark 1992,
Krishnan and Ulrich 2001). Given tight project schedules,
many engineers cannot afford to wait until all required
information input is available, and have to start “in the
dark,” requiring close coordination with other interde-
pendent activities.
Coordination among tightly coupled (interdependent)
and parallel tasks forces parallel teams to share prelimi-
nary information about work in progress. Production tool
orders have to be based on rough sketches of product
designs, product concepts must be developed while un-
certainty remains about the customer’s needs, and com-
ponents must be specified while interacting systems are
still under development.
This kind of coordination often proceeds in an infor-
mal, ad hoc manner. It is hard to tell if the right infor-
mation is being shared at the right time, as in the place
of factual data (“the total vehicle mass is 3,126 pounds”);
there is only vague preliminary data (“at present, we ex-
pect the vehicle mass to be around 3,000 pounds”). As
one automotive executive put it, “Designing a car is much
like building a house: you cannot afford to suspend the
kitchen planning until you have put up the walls. But, if
you start the kitchen planning too early, using preliminary
floor plans from the architect, you are likely to do it twice.
[. . .] We need a new way of exchanging information
between the architect and the kitchen planner. Currently,
our kitchen planner’s idea of concurrent engineering is
that they should receive the floor plans as they did in the
past, just six months earlier. They don’t understand that
the nature of the information has changed!”
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This highlights the two fundamental coordination prob-
lems addressed in this article. First, the uncertainty1
facing the kitchen planner with the floor plan may not
necessarily arise from technologies or markets, but may
be a consequence of the project manager’s decision to
overlap (execute in parallel) two sequentially dependent
activities. But how can the architect (upstream) inform
the kitchen planner (downstream) that the information is
only preliminary in nature?
Second, we need to understand how the downstream
party should use the preliminary information. If treated
as final information, it is likely to lead to costly rework
(if you plan the kitchen twice, you order a large appliance
but end up not having the space to put it in). At the other
extreme, not releasing any information until it has “con-
verged” basically holds up the kitchen planning until the
walls are up—an approach which avoids rework but sac-
rifices any time gains from parallel task execution.
Coordination strategies outlined in the existing orga-
nizational literature have primarily focused on finding ap-
propriate organizational structures to respond to uncer-
tainty and interdependencies (Brown and Eisenhardt
1995). However, as most of these models have been static
in nature (Adler 1995), they cannot fully capture the con-
cept of concurrency, which is by definition time depen-
dent. Prior studies have also left the concept of prelimi-
nary information itself undefined, despite numerous
recommendations to define it (e.g., Clark and Fujimoto
1991).
In the case of the kitchen planner, the existing literature
would recommend forming a cross-functional team and
engaging in frequent information exchanges. Although an
important first step in dealing with uncertainty and inter-
dependence, this fails to answer the fundamental question
of what to communicate.
The key questions when coordinating concurrent tasks
are not how often to exchange information, but rather
what information to exchange at what moment in time,
and how to react to it. Moreover, preliminary information
exchange, which results from the combination of inter-
dependence and concurrency, is a time-dependent con-
struct which is gradually finalized as upstream advances
in its problem solving (or, if the uncertainty is caused by
external events, as these events unfold). A model address-
ing this issue must be dynamic in nature.
Theoretically our work extends a classical line of re-
search on information exchange, uncertainty, and inter-
dependence (e.g. Thompson 1967, Galbraith 1973) which
has frequently been used as a theoretical foundation for
the literature in the emerging field of new product devel-
opment, such as Clark and Fujimoto (1991), Sobek et al.
(1999), Krishnan et al. (1997), and Loch and Terwiesch
(1998). More recently, detailed empirical studies of new
product development projects have not only applied ex-
isting organizational theories, but successfully extended
them (e.g. Adler 1995, Staudenmeyer 1999, Eisenhardt
and Tabrizi 1995).
In this article we present a qualitative study of an en-
gineering project facing several situations of interdepen-
dence and concurrency, thus heavily dependent on pre-
liminary information exchange. Using data collected
from 10 engineering decisions traced on-site in a vehicle
development project, we develop a dynamic model of co-
ordination that hinges on the concept of preliminary in-
formation exchange. We study this exchange from three
perspectives: that of the information-providing party, the
information-receiving party, and of the system designer,
as is reflected in our three research questions:
•How does the information provider transmit prelimi-
nary information, and how is it revised over time?
•How do downstream activities adjust to changes in the
preliminary information received?
•What trade-offs are relevant for downstream when us-
ing preliminary information, and specifically, can prelim-
inary information be traded off against budget, time, or
system performance?
Based on these perspectives, we present a time-dependent
model for coordinating interdependent tasks which in turn
helps to define two alternative coordination strategies that
we label iterative and set based. Second, we address the
trade-offs faced by a development team in choosing a
coordination strategy and how they change over time.
This allows an organization to match its problem-solving
strategy with the interdependence it faces. Relying on
preliminary information too early can lead to rework in
the form of costly iterations. Conversely, waiting for in-
formation to reach a desired level of certainty foregoes
the time gains that come with parallel problem solving.
We start by clarifying the theoretical problem of co-
ordinating concurrent interdependent tasks and how it re-
lates to existing literature in organizational theory and
new product development. Secondly, we present our re-
search methodology and a detailed description of the en-
gineering decisions requiring coordination. Building on
on-site observations, the three perspectives of preliminary
information are presented. From this we derive the two
coordination strategies and identify the managerial trade-
offs involved in choosing between them.
Theoretical Problem and Literature
Background
Consider a very simple example of a development pro-
cess where two activities are overlapped to reduce de-
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Figure 1 Coordinating Parallel Activities Requires the Use of
Preliminary Information
velopment leadtime. The overlap allows the information-
absorbing downstream operation (e.g., stamping die
development) to start before the information-supplying
upstream activity (e.g., product design) is completed,
thereby potentially reducing the overall cycle time due to
concurrency benefits.2
In a fully sequential process (Figure 1, left), no infor-
mation is released to downstream until upstream has
gained full knowledge of its task. When downstream fi-
nally starts, it can rely on finalized information from up-
stream. This is symbolized by a formal release milestone
in the process (the diamond shape in Figure 1) corre-
sponding to the classical stage-gate model.
Although the overlap creates a direct time gain by
downstream starting early, it is not without drawbacks.3
Executing two activities concurrently (Figure 1, right)
forces downstream to sacrifice quality of information and
use preliminary information. If there is no concurrency,
information can be exchanged in its final form. If there is
no dependence, there is no need to exchange information.
Thus preliminary information is the direct consequence
of the interaction between task concurrency and depen-
dence.
Such preliminary information tends to be based on a
low-to-medium level of upstream knowledge, symbolized
by lighter shading in Figure 1. The earlier downstream
starts, the higher the risk of future changes, especially if
the outcome of the upstream activity is hard or impossible
to predict. In this case, overlapping activities risk creating
additional engineering effort in the form of rework (Stoy
1996). Rework can consume up to 50% of the engineering
capacity and up to one-third of the development budget
(Clark and Fujimoto 1991, Soderberg 1989).
The well-known NPD process models (such as stage-
gate, waterfall, or evolutionary models known from en-
gineering and software development, see, e.g., Cooper
1993 or Boehm 1981) show how uncertainty is resolved
over time but do not address how to coordinate parallel
activities. Within product development, Eastman (1980)
was the first to discuss the benefits and dangers of com-
mitting engineering resources to nonfinal specifications.
This work was further refined by Clark and Fujimoto’s
(1991) studies in the automotive industry, specifically in
the context of stamping die development. Taking an
information-processing perspective,4 the authors identi-
fied intensive communication as a key driver of devel-
opment performance. Instead of batching the information
created by one activity and handing it on to the next, it
was found to be more effective to release preliminary
information early and let downstream use it to start in
parallel.
Although this line of research has substantially im-
proved current understanding of development processes,
looking at communication frequency and organizational
structures alone cannot fully resolve the managerial chal-
lenges of dealing with preliminary information. Indeed,
most companies have implemented many aspects of
cross-functional integration over the last decade. In con-
trast with the large volume of literature on communica-
tion frequency, little work has been done on the format
and timing of the information exchange. This is consistent
with Scrivener et al. (2000), who emphasize the impor-
tance of what is communicated, as opposed to the media
used or the frequency of the exchange. Unlike Scrivener
et al., our focus is on need for information exchange, not
on the mechanisms and media used to exchange it. Needs
for information content are media independent (Scrivener
et al. 2000, p. 349).
Allen (1977) observed that communication changes
over the course of a project, both literature research and
personal advice, decrease over time, although the latter
surges again toward the end due to interface problems.
Since this study, the dynamic nature of the interdepen-
dence resulting from task concurrency has been neglected
with the exception of Adler (1995), who points out that
uncertainty and interdependence can dynamically change
in the course of a project. We extend Adler’s work by
looking at situations of interdependence and concurrency,
adding a further level of complexity.
Our research seeks an operational definition of prelim-
inary information, needed not just from an academic
standpoint, but also, as the initial kitchen example illus-
trates, for effective information exchange in practice.5
Secondly, it explores how downstream reacts to prelim-
inary information. This implies the presence of costs and
trade-offs, which is the third area explored.
Research Methodology
The automotive industry is a natural candidate for re-
search on the coordination of concurrent activities: Car
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development projects combine novelty with complexity
(and thus task interdependence), and use task concurrency
widely, thereby creating the coordination problem that
interests us. Moreover, previous studies of concurrent en-
gineering in this industry allow results to be compared
(e.g., Clark and Fujimoto 1991, Cusumano and Nobeoka
1998). Task concurrency is, of course, used in other in-
dustries, such as electronics (Terwiesch and Loch 1999b),
airplane design (Sabbagh 1996), and film making (Trip
1997).
Our effort to extend previous research on preliminary
information6 started with a visit to our host company,
where we presented results from our own modeling (Loch
and Terwiesch 1998) and survey-based (Terwiesch and
Loch 1999b) research. While the audience did not dis-
agree with any of the arguments presented, including the
need for greater concurrency and for frequent information
exchange between parties working concurrently, they
cited other problems, including the introductory quota-
tion. At a follow-up meeting, we agreed to explore pre-
liminary information further and defined specific research
objectives (similar to those presented in the previous sec-
tion).7
Research Site
We decided to focus on the climate control system (CCS)
of a new vehicle under development. We narrowed our
focus to one subsystem rather than the overall vehicle, as
field-based research (see data collection methods below)
required an in-depth observation of how engineering de-
cisions evolved over time and how engineers exchange
preliminary information. By examining such a “micro-
cosm” we could interview all the engineers involved with
the actual CCS design including its interfaces (about 40
individuals).
A detailed system overview of the CCS is provided in
Figure 2. The CCS contains all components and devel-
opment activities related to the passenger’s climate en-
vironment, including air ventilation, air cleaning, warm
up, and cool down. It was chosen over other subsystems
because of the strong need for coordination and infor-
mation exchange. Referring to the air intake of the car
(part of the CCS), one interviewee explained: “Here at
the air-intake you find all the problems we have in the
development of new vehicles: coordination with other
components (e.g., fire-wall, engine) and information re-
lease to tooling.” Together with the dashboard, the CCS
is the subsystem with the most interfaces to other activ-
ities.
Selected Cases
The unit of analysis in our study is the exchange between
an information-supplying upstream activity and an
information-receiving downstream activity. Given our re-
search focus, we are only interested in cases where down-
stream starts its work at a point before upstream has fi-
nalized its problem solving. With the help of the host
company, we identified 10 such cases within the scope of
the CCS, each relating to different components.
For each case, we focused on one piece of information
that fulfilled two criteria. First, the information had to
move, over the course of our observation, from an initial
estimate to a finalized design decision. Second, it had to
relate to an important interdependence, thereby causing
substantial rework downstream if not transmitted to the
receiver. We then identified the sender (upstream) who
had to forward this information to a receiver (down-
stream) prior to completing its problem solving. Thus, the
communication dyad faced a situation similar to that de-
scribed in Figure 1.
Data Collection
Data collection was performed over four months, during
which the first author stayed on-site full time. This per-
manent presence enabled us to monitor the evolution of
information and gain access to data sources usually
closed to outsiders. Data were collected from multiple
sources, including interviews, participation in relevant
meetings, and internal project management information
systems.
About 100 semistructured interviews were conducted
with 40 engineers and management, including upstream
(information-sending) and downstream (information-
receiving) parties for every component. Initial individual
interviews lasted from one to two hours. Subsequently,
one to three follow-up interviews lasting between 15 and
45 minutes helped to capture what had happened since
the previous interview.
We passively participated in all relevant meetings on
the 10 components. A typical week included five meet-
ings (for all components together). About two-thirds of
them occurred on a routine basis (e.g., every Tuesday
afternoon). All meetings were cross-functional and, in
most cases, included an outside supplier. They were held
on the company’s development campus, either in confer-
ence rooms or the prototyping lab. In addition to those
related to CCS development, we also participated in
weekly package meetings on overall vehicle develop-
ment, where space allocation among various modules was
discussed. Each component was owned by one engineer,
who had to coordinate with engineers of interacting com-
ponents (for example at the package meetings) or manu-
facturing engineers (including suppliers), and get ap-
proval for changes from the CCS project manager.
Problem solving in our host organization was sup-
ported by a number of information systems. In addition
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Figure 2 System Structure of the CCS
to the CAD system, the most important systems for our
research were an engineering change management system
and a quality control list. The engineering change man-
agement system provided a database of all ongoing en-
gineering changes and the anticipated cost and time delay
associated with each one. The quality control list pro-
vided project management with a database of detected
development problems still to be resolved, rather like a
big “to do” list. Each open problem was assigned an eval-
uation of the risk it posed for the overall development
process, a responsible engineer, and the next steps to be
taken. Both systems were invaluable in that they allowed
us to generate data and identify new leads for additional
interviews.
We followed the evolution of specific design decisions
and their corresponding engineering changes over time.
Following the paradigm of grounded research (Miles and
Huberman 1984, Eisenhardt 1989), our analysis built on
detailed field notes—interview notes, transcripts of en-
gineering meetings, and company documents—compiled
into detailed case studies for each engineering decision.
This process was more iterative than sequential as the
emerging cases were frequently updated after follow-up
discussions with respondents. This included two rounds
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of final presentations to engineers involved in the study
as well as to the senior managers who had given us the
go-ahead. Based on the cases, we contrasted various paths
of information evolution, as described below.
Technical Characteristics of the Five Engineering
Problems
Below we provide a detailed description of five of the 10
design decisions, as summarized in Table 1, beginning
with the context of the information exchange, including
sender, receiver, and content.
The five cases are representative of the range of issues
encountered and allow a thorough description of the in-
formation exchanged, the situation of the information-
sending party, and the consequences for the information-
receiving party. They help to convey some of the richness
and complexity of CCS development and show how our
framework for preliminary information is grounded in the
data collected.
Much of the thermal energy used for heating the pas-
senger cabin is supplied by the engine, the remainder
coming from auxiliary heaters. Crucial information to the
development of the CCS is thus the amount of warm wa-
ter supplied by the engine. This is not fully available be-
fore engine development is finalized. Engine develop-
ment supplies preliminary information about the volume
of warm water per second to CCS development, which
then uses a rough estimate to determine its approach to
auxiliary heating.
The geometry of the air-intake/filtering system is highly
dependent on the engine geometry. Packaging space be-
tween engine, fire wall, and dashboard is extremely lim-
ited, requiring careful management of geometrical depen-
dencies. This is particularly relevant for air flows as the
amount of fresh air entering the cabin is a function of this
geometry.
An innovative feature of the CCS is a latent heat stor-
age system (LHSS). Once the engine is running at its
operating temperature, the LHSS can chemically store its
heat for up to several days. This can be used to rapidly
warm up the engine and passenger cabin the next time
the car is started. At the time of our study, the LHSS was
a highly innovative component with unproven demand,
and management was not sure whether to include it.
Given its substantial size, packaging the LHSS into the
vehicle is a rather difficult task which completely changes
the layout of the engine compartment. In this case, un-
certainty and the associated preliminary nature of the in-
formation stemmed from the external market rather than
the overlap of activities.
Cars in general, and the CCS in particular, are increas-
ingly sophisticated in their functionality. The CCS con-
tains a substantial amount of software controlling dozens
of precision motors, fans, and pumps to create a com-
fortable cabin environment. Software development de-
pends on testing results from CCS prototyping in order
to fine-tune the control system.
The fire wall of the car is a solid metal sheet separating
the passenger cabin from the engine compartment. It is a
key component in providing body stiffness, but at the
same time must have many holes to allow air and water
from the engine compartment to enter the cabin, rather
like a “Swiss cheese.” The positions of the holes are im-
portant pieces of information, as they provide the inter-
face between fire-wall development/stiffness, climate
control, and stamping die development for the car body.
The Exchange of Preliminary
Information from Three Perspectives
To derive our two coordination strategies and the trade-
off between them, we first need to describe how prelim-
inary information is exchanged. The description takes
three perspectives: the format of the information as trans-
ferred by upstream, the downstream adjustment costs to
changes, and possible substitutes for preliminary infor-
mation that may be better overall.
Format of the Information Passed from Upstream to
Downstream
The five cases share the same problem: A downstream
development activity has to start with preliminary infor-
mation from an upstream activity. For each of the five
cases we describe in what format the preliminary infor-
mation was passed on, how this uncertainty was resolved
over time, and what format the final information took.
The information needed for an auxiliary heating con-
cept is the amount of water supplied by the engine. This
information can be captured in a single number. While
the first information transfer from the engine group oc-
curred in the form of a number, there was a tacit agree-
ment that this number should be understood more as an
interval. This corresponds to the Krishnan et al. (1997)
set-based framework, with the uncertainty being resolved
in the form of an interval narrowed down over a series of
engine tests.
The information required for the package coordination
between engine and air intake is more complex. The in-
terface is defined not by a single number but through a
complex three-dimensional geometric structure that
evolves with the development of the engine. Not all this
information is relevant for constructing the air intake—
for the development of the air intake/filter box, the geo-
metric details within the engine are of little importance—
but the hull of the engine heavily influences the design
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Table 1 Summary of the Five Cases
Case Information Piece Sender Receiver
Auxiliary Heating
Concept
How much warm water is supplied
by the engine?
Engine Development Development of CCS in Determining
an Auxiliary Heating Concept
Packaging
Air Intake/
Engine
Where to find space in the engine
compartment for air intake and filter
box?
Engine Development, Packaging
Team
Development of CCS in Determining
Air Flow Concepts
LHSS Will there be a LHSS for the car? Management, Based on
Market Experience for a
Predecessor
Development of CCS and all
Package-Critical Activities
CCS
Software
What are the software specifications
for the control unit?
Development of CCS and Testing
Teams
Development of Control Unit
Fire-wall Holes Where to put the holes in the fire-
wall for air and water throughput?
Packaging Team, Development of
CCS
Fire-wall Development, Die
Development
solution, which aims to provide sufficient air throughput
without wasting a cubic centimeter of space. This allows
the engine development team to provide the geometry of
the hull around the engine as preliminary information to
the CCS developers.
In the LHSS case, the required information is ex-
tremely concise: One bit (one binary unit of information)
suffices to capture the “yes/no” answer. This information
became available only after market input from a prede-
cessor project roughly one year before the launch. As a
year was too short to redesign the entire packaging of
such a large component, the information was explicitly
transferred as “yes and no,” meaning that the CCS en-
gineers were expected to be prepared for both scenarios.
This is mathematically similar to the hull of the engine
or the confidence interval for warm water.
The CCS control software needs detailed data from the
CCS prototyping as to how changes in certain control
variables (e.g., rotation speed of a fan) translate into pas-
senger perceptions (e.g., fresh air, noise from fan). Test-
ing and SW development proceed in parallel, relying on
a series of SW prototypes, each of which is developed
according to the latest testing results.
Finally, the relevant information concerning the fire-
wall holes can be described by about 50–100 numbers
describing their geometric position and size. In contrast
to the interval approach of Cases 1 to 3, these data were
often given with high precision initially and then itera-
tively modified (corresponding to the iterative framework
of engineering change orders in Loch and Terwiesch
1998). An additional way of exchanging preliminary in-
formation on holes was to work with “locking zones.” If,
for example, for reasons relating to stiffness, it was un-
desirable to have holes in some areas of the fire wall,
zones could be “locked,” thus prohibiting definition of
holes in the CAD system. Information for the five cases
is summarized in Table 2.
Comparing the five cases in Table 2 points to two char-
acteristics of a piece of preliminary information. First, its
accuracy, which we will refer to as information precision.
For example, the information on the fire-wall hole location
“hole at x  123mm, y  34mm, diameter  5mm” is
precise, whereas the information on the warm water supply
“19–21 liters/hour” is not. A measure of precision for the
latter information could be defined as a range of 2 liters/
hour divided by 20 liters/hour (the midpoint of the inter-
val), or a range of 10% around the midpoint. More gen-
erally, a measure of precision can be derived by comparing
the range of outcomes that is communicated with the range
of all possible outcomes (for discrete sets), or by compar-
ing the range of communicated outcomes to the distance
of the range from zero (for parameter intervals).
The second characteristic of preliminary information is
the likelihood of it no longer changing through the re-
mainder of the process, which we refer to as information
stability. The information for the LHSS is fully stable, as
“yes” and “no” provide all possible outcomes, and thus
the statistical probability that this information will remain
unchanged is 100%. This contrasts with the parameters
for the software systems, which will almost certainly be
changed. The fire-wall hole positions are also very likely
to be changed, but by using the locking zones described
above, the engineers can reduce changes to the geometry
and thereby create some information stability.
Technically, an accurate measure of stability is only
possible ex post, after potential changes have occurred.
However, our interviews and observations of the engi-
neers’ actions suggest that they form beliefs based on
experience, and thus do estimate the stability construct
ex ante.
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Table 2 Upstream Uncertainty Resolution
Case Uncertainty Resolved Through Format of Preliminary Information Format of Final Information
Auxiliary Heating
Concept
Engine testing Rough guess with tacit
understanding of a confidence
interval
One number
Packaging
Air Intake/ Engine
Engine development CAD models of the hull Detailed geometry (almost
impossible to capture in numbers)
LHSS Market observation Explicit inclusion of both alternatives Yes/No
CCS
Software
Evolutionary prototyping; adjusting
parameters based on test results
Prototype One program and a set of
parameters
Fire-wall Holes Iterative modification Intermediate solutions; use of
locking zones
50–100 numbers describing position
and diameters
For a given amount of knowledge, information preci-
sion and information stability are in conflict with each
other, as the following everyday scenario illustrates. A
traveler flying from Philadelphia to Paris wants to arrange
a pick-up cab at the Paris airport. The day before the
journey, the arrival time in Paris is uncertain. Thus, any
information forwarded to the cab driver will be prelimi-
nary in nature. The traveler can ignore this uncertainty
and communicate an arrival time of 14:34, which is pre-
cise information but unlikely to be stable. Or, she can
focus on information stability and say she will arrive be-
tween 12:00 and 18:00. As the journey unfolds (e.g., prior
to boarding, after take-off, at the baggage claim), the un-
certainty of the arrival time is reduced and the preliminary
information is revised repeatedly until it is fully stable
and precise (as she leaves the airport).
Initially, little information on the resolution of the de-
sign decision is available (low level of knowledge), and
information is neither stable nor precise. As problem
solving on the design decision progresses (level of knowl-
edge increases), information is repeatedly communicated
with changing levels of precision and stability. At the end
of the problem-solving process (high knowledge level),
the design solution is in place and functional both up-
stream and downstream. Now, information is both stable
and precise.
While the beginning and the end point of this path are
fixed, the question arises at the intermediate levels of
knowledge: When should one focus on precision, and
when on stability? Before we can answer it, we first need
to understand how the information receiver (downstream)
reacts to preliminary information and its updates.
Adjustment Costs Downstream
Upstream uncertainty resolution and the release of pre-
liminary information have consequences for the down-
stream activity. Thus, before we can create a framework
on how preliminary information should be exchanged and
used, we need to understand the mechanisms by which
information is needed by downstream and what costs the
preliminary nature of the information creates.
The auxiliary heating concept does not require highly
precise information. A flow deviation of less than 5%
creates no major problem. However, larger deviations re-
quire a new auxiliary heating concept, which is both
costly and time consuming. In addition, downstream ad-
justment becomes more difficult if modifications occur
later. Even minor modifications, if they occur late, can be
very costly and potentially delay the launch of the overall
project.
The only information that matters for air-intake devel-
opment is the hull of the engine. As long as information
changes do not affect this interface, downstream is insen-
sitive to the changes. Hull modifications become more
costly over time because tools for the air intake have very
long leadtimes (special plastic tools) and are difficult to
change. This will be analyzed more formally below.
The information on the LHSS contains only one bit,
but it affects the packaging of the entire engine compart-
ment. Thus, any deviation (e.g., saying “no” first and then
changing to “yes”) has major consequences for all de-
velopment activities involved. A late change may delay
the launch of the car. By saying “yes and no,” the devel-
opment department has to develop two engine compart-
ments in parallel, one with and one without the LHSS.8
The CCS software has a modular product architecture
which separates a set of parameters from the actual soft-
ware itself. These parameters are stored in a separate
memory module. Given this chip design (details dis-
cussed below), the parameters can be changed easily and
inexpensively, however late in the process. In fact, even
an adjustment to customer needs is feasible during after-
sales service. Thus, the cost of adjusting downstream to
new information is minimal.
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Table 3 Downstream Implications of Changes in Preliminary Information
Downstream Adjustment Cost if Information Is Not Stable Downstream Cost if Information Is Not Precise
Case
How flexible is downstream
with respect to upstream
deviations?
Does downstream flexibility
change over time?
Starvation: Can downstream
continue based on
preliminary information?
Duplication: Can
downstream prepare for
multiple outcomes?
Auxiliary Heating
Concept
A bit more or less does not
matter.
Increase in adjustment cost
due to long leadtime for
heating concepts.
Little starvation, as
information was sufficiently
precise.
Developers sketched out
some ideas for the “worst-
case scenario”; nothing
formal was prepared.
Packaging
Air Intake/ Engine
All that matters is the hull;
deviations from that can be
expensive.
Sharp increases of
adjustment costs over time;
usage of “soft-dies” not
possible.
Waiting is possible, risks
however that an inexpensive
part shifts the overall critical
path.
A continuum of different
outcomes / geometry;
makes duplication
impossible.
LHSS Packaging of the entire
engine compartment
depends on this information.
If one said NO initially and
then changed to YES, the
launch would be delayed.
Would shift LHSS on the
overall critical path.
Team prepared for both
outcomes.
CCS
Software
Modular, program remains
stable, only parameter
adjustments.
Very flexible, SW
adjustments possible even
in after sales service.
No, full precision is required
for coding.
Not necessary, given the
ease of change.
Fire-wall Holes Varies, depends on hole
position.
Sharp increases of
adjustment costs over time;
during prototyping, this
increase could be reduced
by “soft dies.”
Some waiting cannot be
avoided.
A continuum of different
outcomes / geometry;
duplication not possible.
Downstream adjustment costs for the fire wall vary
widely depending on the positions of the holes to be
changed. Similar to the filter box tools, the stamping dies
for the fire wall are expensive to change late in the proj-
ect. Repositioning holes becomes much more costly once
tools have been developed: Downstream’s flexibility to
adjust to new information decreases over time. However,
unlike the filter box, it is possible to create stamping dies
for prototype production from softer steel which can be
reworked more easily. Table 3 includes a summary of the
downstream adjustments.
Table 3 suggests two types of couplings between the
information-supplying and the information-receiving ac-
tivities. Rework occurs if downstream commits resources
based on upstream information that later turns out to be
wrong; i.e., was not stable. Rework becomes more costly
the further downstream has progressed in its problem
solving. Almost universally, it is more expensive to make
changes late than early.
For the three air-intake components, there were a total
of 18 design changes after upstream had released its first
precise (but preliminary) information. Like many devel-
opment organizations, our host company required that
such postrelease changes follow a formal process of filing
for an engineering change order (ECO). Formal ECO
documents as well as the company internal tracking sys-
tem for ECOs were used to investigate the relationship
between downstream adjustment costs and the timing of
a change (see Figure 3).
Figure 3 displays the total cost of each ECO as a func-
tion of its occurrence time for the three components of
the air intake. Component 1 had six changes (labeled in
the sequence of their occurrence as A through F), Com-
ponent 2 had four changes (A through D), and Compo-
nent 3 had eight changes (A through H).
According to the timing of their occurrence, ECOs are
classified into three phases: before the start of prototype
tools, before the start of production tools, and after the
start of production tools. For example, Change F in Com-
ponent 1 occurred after production tools had been started,
at a cost of 190,000 euro.9 Change B in Component 3
creates a total cost of 10,000 euro.10
Figure 3 shows for all three air-intake components that
a later detection time of an ECO substantially increased
downstream adjustment cost. Moreover, this increase is
faster than linear (the cost scale in Figure 3 is logarith-
mic). The CCS project manager who had to sign off each
ECO referred to this as the “10x-rule”: the cost resulting
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Figure 3 Relationship Between Timing of a Change and Rework Cost
from a change with identical content increased by a factor
of 10 from one phase to the next.11
While rework is a result of too little stability, the sec-
ond downstream adjustment cost, which we call starva-
tion, is a result of too little precision. Starvation occurs if
the downstream activity runs out of work because there
is too little information available to start or to continue
the task. Starvation is costly, as valuable project time
passes while the downstream activity remains idle wait-
ing for additional information, off-setting at least partially
the benefits of concurrency.
Whether or not starvation occurs depends on the infor-
mation needs of the downstream activity. If exact details
are not necessary for the downstream work to commence,
starvation can be avoided. This is particularly the case if
only a subset of tasks within the downstream activity re-
quires detailed information, while others are reasonably
“generic.” For example, engineers working on the warm
water system could start designing a circuit of pipes for
moving warm water from the engine to the main heating
units as well as a fixture to hold the auxiliary burner. This
design work is fairly generic with respect to changes in
the warm water supply. However, the design of the aux-
iliary heating unit itself (especially its capacity sizing)
required more precise information about the warm water
supply, and at that point only smaller deviations (about
5%) could be tolerated.
Sometimes starvation can be avoided by duplication.
In the LHSS case it was avoided by developing two al-
ternative packaging concepts of the front end in parallel.
Obviously, such an approach is costly in terms of engi-
neering resources and prototyping hardware. However,
by enumerating the complete outcome set of the infor-
mation (yes and no), the team could achieve high preci-
sion while retaining stability, thereby maintaining the
benefits of concurrency.
Duplication requires the set of possible outcomes to be
relatively small. It could not, therefore, be applied to the
CCS software, where for combinatorial reasons the num-
ber of possible parameter constellations was in the mil-
lions. The only other element of duplication among the
five cases was the warm water case:12 While not going as
far as developing two complete designs, engineers did
prepare a “back-up plan” in case the volume of water
supplied was too low.
Substitutes for Information: Decoupling and
Increasing Downstream Flexibility
The cost of downstream adjustment can be reduced or
even eliminated if it is possible either to weaken inter-
dependence between upstream and downstream, or to
make downstream so flexible that adjustment becomes
almost costless.
In discussing the information format and downstream
adjustment cost, we have treated interdependence as ex-
ogenous. However it can, in many cases, be weakened,
allowing for the decomposition of the design problem,
thereby reducing the need for coordination,13 or it may
be possible to increase downstream’s flexibility to absorb
changes (Thomke 1997). While both mechanisms are
clearly desirable from an information-processing per-
spective, they come at the price of reduced system per-
formance, increased manufacturing cost, or increased de-
velopment budget and are therefore referred to as
substitutes for information. Table 4 summarizes the five
cases.
Consider first the CCS software. It has low adjustment
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Table 4 Opportunities for Substituting Information (Reducing the Need for Coordination)
Case Can the interdependence be weakened?
How can downstream’s flexibility in absorbing
changes be increased?
Auxiliary Heating
Concept
Rather than relying on heat from the engine, all heat
could be created by an extra burner; penalty in the
form of higher weight and cost.
If the heater is sufficiently powerful, any reduction in
warm water supply can be absorbed with minor
changes.
Packaging
Air Intake/ Engine
Almost impossible, given the dense package. Soft dies are impossible to use even during prototyping
given the material requirements.
LHSS Modular design possible; would substantially reduce
package density or product performance.
Change could only be absorbed by a modular design
(see left).
CCS
Software
Separation of algorithm and parameters; thus, only a
few numbers need to be modified.
By using a rewriteable memory for storing the
parameters, the traditional ASIC redesign is avoided;
Unit cost increased by about 30%.
Fire-wall Holes Some small holes can be created independent of die
design, at the cost of requiring an additional process
step.
Use of soft dies possible during prototyping.
Figure 4 Trading Off Information Precision with Information
Stability in Theory (Left) and for the Five Observed
Cases in the CCS
cost (Table 3), but at a price. Traditionally it was “hard-
wired” on an ASIC chip, with little opportunity for ad-
justment. More recently, the software was moved to a
chip with rewriteable memory to store the parameter set
(similar to a PC, although much smaller in storage ca-
pacity) at an increased cost of three euro per unit (a sig-
nificant cost considering the large volumes involved).
Moving the entire software (not only the parameter set)
to a rewriteable memory would have cost eight euros
more per unit. In this case, interdependence was weak-
ened by separating the parameters from the remaining
software, and the adjustment flexibility was increased by
working with rewriteable memory instead of ASIC tech-
nology.
In the LHSS case, dependence on results from mar-
keting could have been reduced had the team designed a
more modular front end with a “slot” for the LHSS, to be
used or left empty depending on the marketing decision
(similar to the design of most desktop PCs), thus giving
the team a design option (Baldwin and Clark 1997). How-
ever, it would have meant reduced package density, re-
quiring either a longer car or a higher engine compart-
ment, both of which were unacceptable to our host
company.
In principle, the auxiliary heater also offered an op-
portunity for increasing downstream’s flexibility. If it had
been sufficiently powerful, it could have produced any
amount of warm water independently of the engine. How-
ever, such “over-engineering” increases cost (higher per-
unit procurement cost for the heater) and reduces product
performance (excess weight).
Finally, the soft dies discussed in conjunction with Ta-
ble 3 offer yet another way to make downstream more
flexible in reacting to change. As long as changes to the
fire wall occur prior to or during prototype tooling, they
can be incorporated relatively easily as the steel used is
easier to shape. The cost of this flexibility lies in the pur-
chase of the soft dies, which lack durability for volume
production and therefore have to be scrapped after pro-
totyping. Interdependence could be weakened by intro-
ducing an additional process by which holes in the fire
wall are created by an intelligent/programmable press.
Discussion: Set-Based and Iterative Coordination
Strategies
Having explored the tension between information preci-
sion and stability, and understood the economic impact
of preliminary information on the downstream activity,
we now integrate the two perspectives into a coherent
framework.
Set-Based and Iterative Coordination
Figure 4 (left) shows that, at each point of information
exchange, a decision must be made about the degree of
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precision and of stability. Taking as fixed the level of
knowledge of the problem (the design progress status),
there are two options. On the one hand, one can com-
municate the information in a way that is very stable (i.e.,
the probability of change is less than some threshold
value, e.g., 1%). While this strategy allows downstream
to commit resources based on the information without
running the risk of rework, given the low precision it may
not be able to continue at all (i.e., starvation) or have to
perform duplication (redundant work), as in the LHSS
case. This corresponds to moving sideways to the right
in Figure 4.
On the other hand, one can communicate the infor-
mation in a way that is very precise. Downstream can
then proceed with operational information, but at the risk
of having to iterate and redo part of the work if modifi-
cations occur, as we have seen in the case of the air intake
or the CCS software. This corresponds to moving upward
in Figure 4. Obviously, any intermediate point can also
be chosen. However the team decides to resolve this
trade-off, there is a limit (in the sense of a frontier) to
how far it can move along in one period of time. For
example, the endpoint of the upper right is out of reach
for most information exchanges.
Choosing between stable and precise communication
repeatedly over time results in a path through the matrix
defined in Figure 4 (left). This path summarizes the co-
ordination strategy between upstream and downstream.
Figure 4 (right) illustrates this path for our five cases
(summarizing the discussion under Tables 3 and 4).
While the beginning (low level of knowledge) and end
points (complete knowledge) of each path are fixed, dif-
ferent trajectories are observed in between. A path which
gravitates towards the lower-right quadrant emphasizes
information stability at the risk of possible starvation or
duplication of downstream effort. We call this set-based
coordination strategy. In contrast to this, the path gravi-
tating towards the upper left, called iterative coordination
strategy, emphasizes precision at the expense of increas-
ing rework.
As can be seen in Figure 4 (right), an iterative strategy
was used for the CCS software, where information was
always communicated precisely, whereas the number of
changes clearly indicates a low emphasis on stability. The
auxiliary heating concepts case illustrates a more set-
based approach, where an interval was communicated
first, then narrowed over time. As the interval was not
communicated explicitly, and therefore might have wid-
ened again at some point, the information was not fully
stable.
The LHSS provides the most extreme case. Full sta-
bility was maintained from the beginning, since the set
of possibilities (“yes” or “no”) did not change. Precision
remained low until the engine compartment packaging
was two-thirds complete, then jumped to 100% on the
day of management’s decision to include the LHSS.
Pure set-based or iterative strategies are the extremes.
Intermediate choices are available, as the air-intake and
the fire wall holes show. In both cases, there were a large
number of engineering changes, suggesting a more iter-
ative strategy. At the same time, both cases used certain
set-based elements in communicating preliminary infor-
mation: In the air-intake case the engine group commu-
nicated the hull around the engine. In the fire wall case
the locking zones followed the set-based paradigm.
Choosing Between Iterative and Set-Based
Coordination Strategies
Unlike previous studies, which either assert the superi-
ority of one problem-solving strategy over the other (e.g.,
Sobek et al. 1999), or suggest a link between problem
solving and the nature of its technology and/or environ-
ment (Eisenhardt and Tabrizi 1995, Terwiesch and Loch
1999a), our study suggests that an organization should
master and apply both coordination strategies within a
single development project. With this capability, it can
then choose its coordination strategy for every situation
of concurrency and interdependence encountered over the
course of a project.
In each instance, the choice between the two strategies
is driven by the cost of rework relative to the cost of
duplication and starvation. As the relative cost of rework
grows, stability becomes more attractive. In addition to
this cost-based argument, other conditions can facilitate
or hinder the effective deployment of a coordination strat-
egy.
Attractiveness of an Iterative Coordination Strategy.
An iterative strategy requires that interdependence be-
tween upstream and downstream is either relatively weak
(typically as a result of a modular design), or that down-
stream is flexible in absorbing changes (as in the rewri-
teable memory for the CCS software). As discussed in
conjunction with Table 4, both provide the means to sub-
stitute the need for information by paying the price of
lower system performance or higher cost, hence, they fa-
vor an iterative strategy.
As a result of its focus on precision (at the cost of
stability), an iterative strategy is likely to lead to numer-
ous engineering change orders. Our study found that the
formal approval process for ECOs was cumbersome—
between 10 days and a whole year for an ECO to be
signed off by all parties.15 This is clearly a severe hand-
icap to applying the iterative strategy.
The approval process reflected the engineers’ desire to
have change unfold in an orderly manner, consistent with
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their current mode of “sensemaking” (Weick 1993). As a
case in point, the development engineer for the air intake
had been constructing a particular component for over a
year, based on design assumptions (such as the available
space) that were formally written down and “frozen” in
previous information exchanges. Subsequently, he had to
cope with a total of 18 ECOs (see Figure 3), many of
them based on elements beyond his horizon, which thus
had no obvious logic. As a result, his sensemaking col-
lapsed, leaving him in severe stress, and he took extended
sick leave. (Weick calls this a cosmology episode).
Weick (1993) presents several sources of resilience, in-
cluding “improvisation and bricolage” and “respectful in-
teraction.” The more experienced engineers accepted the
need for late rework and understood that the company
sold cars thanks to strong engines, not CCS systems. They
were able to retain their creativity despite the new cir-
cumstances and increased pressure caused by late ECOs.
Their reaction was that of a “bricoleur”—tinkering with
whatever constraints were imposed late in the process. In
contrast, functional engineers who were used to working
on CCS components only could not accept the disruption
and instead of working around it, took a more defensive
approach. Indeed, in the course of our research, this group
hired external consultants to help further document and
standardize the process (with the aim of imposing control
and curbing unexpected engineering changes).
Attractiveness of a Set-Based Coordination Strategy.
Having a large search space (a large number of alterna-
tives to be considered) makes effective duplication (as
proposed by set-based communication) more expensive
and thus favors the iterative strategy. Set-based commu-
nication also requires the existence of “natural sets,” that
is, to what extent the uncertainty can be communicated
with a few bits (e.g., the LHSS with 0/1, or the warm
water supply with a confidence interval).
This points to another important prerequisite of the set-
based approach: In order to be able to define a meaningful
set, upstream must know which elements of its design
problem will create interdependence with downstream.
Schrader et al. (1993) point to the difference between
uncertainty and ambiguity in engineering problem solv-
ing. They define a situation as uncertain if the problem
solver understands the structure of the problem (including
the set of relevant variables), but lacks knowledge con-
cerning the value of these variables. A situation is am-
biguous if neither the variables themselves (as opposed
to just their realized values) are known nor the problem-
solving mechanisms to increase the knowledge.
In the case of the warm water supply, both parties knew
that the amount of warm water supplied represented the
only interdependence between upstream and downstream.
Thus, the variable was known and only its value missing.
In this situation, the set-based approach ensured down-
stream that no other interdependence existed, which left
downstream with uncertainty, but no ambiguity.
Similarly, the software example was one of little am-
biguity (all parameters were defined in the software, the
mechanism to find the optimal parameters; i.e., engine
testing, was known) but high uncertainty. The team’s
choice of an iterative coordination strategy was a result
of the trade-off related to the downstream adjustment
cost. While it would have been possible to rely on a set-
based approach, it was not economical.
In contrast to these two examples, the situation of the
air intake was substantially more ambiguous. Being the
first air intake of this type, there was no experience to
build upon. The engineers initially evaluated the situation
as one of uncertainty, with the engine geometry being the
only relevant information. But many additional, unex-
pected variables surfaced, leading to the numerous ECOs
described earlier.16 Thus, while a set-based strategy
seemed attractive from an economic perspective, the na-
ture of the problem (at least at the given knowledge level)
forced the team into an iterative strategy.17 This was not
consciously chosen by the team but simply “happened”
after their set-based strategy failed. This underlines the
importance of prior experience with a similar interdepen-
dence when choosing between the two coordination strat-
egies. Figure 5 summarizes the choice between the two
coordination strategies.
As Schrader et al. (1993) discuss, the difference be-
tween uncertainty and ambiguity can have implications
for the way engineers go about framing a problem. His-
torically, downstream has the luxury of commencing the
design work after a predefined milestone, at which up-
stream would hand over all relevant information (stable
and precise). In the language of Weick (1993), engineers
could be seen as engaging in “conditioned viewing”; i.e.,
passive and relying on analyzable data coming from up-
stream, partitioned in defined milestones. As tasks over-
lap to reduce cycle time, the role of milestones shrinks
and engineers must change their interpretive behavior of
information they receive. If this change does not occur, a
collapse in sensemaking can occur (see above).
If well-defined parameters can be identified that incor-
porate the dependence between the tasks, the set-based
coordination strategy can turn ambiguity into uncertainty:
It forces all parties to explicitly identify the range of up-
stream outcomes, for which one can, in principle, assign
probabilities. This facilitates sensemaking and allows en-
gineers to continue conditioned viewing, as the infor-
mation remains fully stable. Thus, one benefit of the set-
based approach is that uncertainty becomes explicit in the
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Figure 5 Choosing Between Iterative and Set-Based Coordination
information exchange. It is better to have information la-
beled as uncertain than to commit resources based on as-
sumptions that later turn out to be wrong. As the intro-
ductory quotation shows, understanding the preliminary
nature of information, manifested as instability or impre-
cision, is crucial but often lacking.
This is often not achievable, for two reasons. First,
when the design problem is novel (as for the filter box),
dependencies cannot be described beforehand. Second,
when design knowledge in the upstream task is tacit, the
upstream designer may be unable to communicate his an-
ticipated solution to the downstream task. Thus, down-
stream is left ambiguous about upstream changes and
their impact (e.g., Nonaka 1991).
When ambiguity cannot be avoided, upstream problem
solving must combine multiple parallel approaches (to
find one that works) with iteration (to adjust the best ap-
proach as knowledge emerges). This is what Sobek et al.
(1999) call set-based exploration (see also Pich et al.
2002). Similarly, Bucciarelli (1994) in his ethnographic
study of three design projects demonstrated ambiguity
and showed how engineers negotiated an emerging
shared meaning in a social process, combining multiple
solutions with iteration.
Our study, however, concentrates on concurrent activ-
ities between an upstream and a downstream task. The
very nature of ambiguity makes it virtually impossible for
downstream to anticipate all possible upstream solutions,
and thus to pursue a set-based approach. Thus, one may
not want to proceed concurrently at all, letting upstream
finish before starting downstream. Indeed, some project
management literature counsels against concurrency in
highly novel projects (e.g., Morris and Hugh 1987, Loch
and Terwiesch 2000). Concurrency is appropriate when
the design is far enough advanced to largely eliminate
ambiguity.
If one does proceed concurrently in the presence of
ambiguity (as was the case for the air intake), iteration is
the only possible approach: Trial and error, learning and
subsequent adjustment lead to an emerging solution (e.g.,
Thomke 1998). This situation requires that engineers
change their modes of interpretation and are flexible in
reworking solutions that have already progressed part of
the way (which the air-intake engineer was not capable
of). This iterative process can be greatly facilitated if the
system architecture has reduced the cost of iteration (as
is discussed in Table 4).
Figure 5 summarizes the choice between the iterative
and set-based coordination strategies in a stylized “deci-
sion tree.” If the dependence of the concurrent tasks is
ambiguous, only iteration is de facto possible. If only un-
certainty is present, the choice is determined by decou-
pling (modularity) and the comparison of downstream ad-
justment costs, costs of duplication and of starvation.
Summary and Conclusion
In this article, we develop a dynamic model of coordi-
nating parallel development activities based on an in-
depth field study. It rests on an operational definition of
preliminary information, consisting of information pre-
cision and information stability. This complements the
rapidly growing literature on concurrent engineering,
which extensively refers to the construct without provid-
ing a clear definition.
Our objective is to identify variables that together rep-
resent the complex construct of preliminary information
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Figure 6 Three Modes of Coordinating Parallel Activities
exchange in concurrent engineering projects and to ex-
plore how these are connected with the engineers’
problem-solving patterns. This is consistent with Miles
and Huberman’s (1984, p. 7) definition of grounded the-
ory. Our study is based on multiple sources of data gath-
ered on-site in a detailed qualitative study. However, we
are concerned more with the development and refinement
of theory than with a descriptive report of the developers
“Lebenswelt.”18 We believe that Figures 3, 4, and 5 and
the analysis presented in this article do provide an exten-
sion of the previous state of theory (as was summarized
Figure 1). While the initiation of our study was collabo-
rative and did lead to improvements in the practice of
concurrent engineering in our host company, this work
does not, it should be noted, represent action research or
a formal field experiment.
Figure 6 summarizes some of our findings. The left part
illustrates the iterative strategy, in which upstream relies
on high-precision preliminary information (displayed as
), but faces the risk of rework. The middle part il-
lustrates a set-based strategy which focuses on stability
(displayed as , which symbolizes the common de-
nominator among all possible outcomes at this point in
time); the insufficient precision can, however, lead to star-
vation of downstream. The right part of Figure 6 sum-
marizes a set-based strategy that uses duplication (dis-
played in the form of downstream working on multiple
outcomes in parallel) to avoid starvation.
The two strategies outlined are of direct managerial
importance, as they shift from the traditional question
“how much should we communicate” (to which the re-
sponse is generally “a lot” among strongly coupled tasks)
to the question of defining a trajectory over time between
information stability and information precision.
Finally, by shedding light on the underlying trade-offs
linked to the usage of preliminary information, we pro-
vide a simple tool to guide concurrent engineering teams
in their choice between an iterative and a set-based in-
formation exchange strategy. We describe various costs
of downstream adjustment as well as substitutes for in-
formation that facilitate especially the iterative strategy.
Our study extends the earlier work by Adler (1995) by
exploring and refining the temporal dimension in
information-processing situations. Specifically, we inves-
tigate a situation of concurrent task execution, which cre-
ates an additional level of complexity in managing the
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information exchange. In such a situation, it is necessary
to look at the information content (not only at the timing
and frequency of an exchange), including how prelimi-
nary information impacts the downstream task and the
team’s problem solving. We also refine the work by Clark
and Fujimoto (1991), by providing the first operational
definition of preliminary information and addressing
trade-offs related to its usage.
By grounding our study in detailed data of engineering
problem-solving, collected on-site, we also complement
the existing literature from a methodological perspective.
Over the past years, most studies have relied on inter-
viewing, survey data, or mathematical modeling, meth-
odologies that tend to lose at least some of the richness
of the underlying phenomena. While on-site observation
allowed us to discover new phenomena in concurrent en-
gineering, it raises issues characteristic of single-company
studies: biases, reproducibility, and, most importantly,
generalizability. By following methodological guidelines in
our data collection, we seek to minimize these problems.
More research is needed to ultimately settle the generaliz-
ability question.
This article focuses on preliminary information ex-
change in a concurrent engineering environment. How-
ever, we believe that our findings are of relevance to other
domains of managing interdependent tasks under time
pressure. For example, preliminary information about
sales forecasts is now routinely shared in supply chains,
enabled by advances in communication technologies.
Some of the latest mathematical models in the related
literature include constructs that are conceptually similar
to our information precision and information stability.
Sales forecasts have historically been shared as if they
were final information (high precision), but recently re-
searchers have used concepts like a minimum purchase
commitment (of at least the specified quantity), which
leads to increased stability for the seller (e.g., Tayur et al.
1999).
Several additional opportunities for future research re-
main. First, our exploratory investigation provides emerg-
ing variables and trade-offs that are important in man-
aging preliminary information. Our framework implicitly
states a number of hypotheses that can be tested by future
research such as the definition of measures and the col-
lection of additional data, which also would overcome the
limited generalizability referred to. Second, we have only
touched upon the interesting issue of sensemaking and
how it relates to the exchange of preliminary information
as well as how it influences the engineer’s framing of the
problem under consideration.
Finally, it is important to explore the impact of increas-
ingly powerful information technologies in product de-
velopment. Contrary to numerous statements in the busi-
ness press, new technologies or organizational forms (as
in the supply chain example cited earlier) by themselves
do not reduce the need for coordination. Indeed, the im-
portance of preliminary information is likely to grow in
a world of unlimited bandwidth. New support technolo-
gies such as CAD or rapid prototyping may substantially
change the cost structure of engineering, and potentially
reduce both downstream adjustment costs (as simulated
designs can be changed quickly) and duplication costs (as
virtual prototypes are much cheaper). Thus they reduce
the cost of task concurrency, encouraging its use and am-
plifying the need for coordination of parallel activities
(e.g., Baba and Nobeoka 1998, Bensaou 1999). However,
the impact of the new technologies on the relative merit
of iterative or set-based coordination might go either way.
Making decisions based on such preliminary information
will therefore remain a key managerial challenge. Inves-
tigating its usage in other environments seems a worth-
while research effort.
The surface has simply been scratched, and much work
lies ahead. This article contributes to moving the coor-
dination of concurrent activities and preliminary infor-
mation, in Clark and Fujimoto’s (1991, p. 236) words,
from “something of an art” to a science.
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Endnotes
1The relationship between uncertainty and ambiguity is discussed in
§5.
2Note that by labeling one activity upstream and the other downstream,
we are assuming that one activity supplies information to the other
during a given information exchange. This does not imply that the
information is “thrown over the wall” to downstream. Coordination
prior to or during the problem solving can occur, similar to Adler
(1995).
3In this study, we take the degree of overlap as exogenously given and
focus our attention on the information exchange. We refer the inter-
ested reader to the work by Krishnan et al. 1997, Loch and Terwiesch
1998, and Terwiesch and Loch 1999b for the question of when and
how much to overlap.
4See Thompson 1967, Galbraith 1973, Van de Ven et al. 1976, Victor
and Blackburn 1987.
5The need for additional research related to the preliminary information
concept is summarized by Clark and Fujimoto (1991): “There remains
something of an art involved, for example, in leaving a slightly thicker
cutting margin in an area of the die more likely to be affected by design
changes, or in recognizing that the location of holes in a door panel
change more frequently than the anticipated shape.”
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6As our host company was German, it did not use the words prelimi-
nary information, but talked about “unscharfe Informationen.” This
translates to “fuzzy information.” We decided not to use the word fuzz-
iness, as it would suggest an application of Zadeh’s concept of fuzzy
logic (e.g., Zadeh 1994 for a recent summary), which is only remotely
related to our study.
7We received no pay or financial support from our host company. We
were permitted access to the company based on prior relations between
ourselves and the host company, and because of the joint curiosity that
was created during our initial meeting.
8Readers familiar with the auto industry know that this duplicated effort
costs several million euros.
9One euro is slightly less than one United States dollar.
10Depending on its occurrence time, an ECO causes different types of
rework. Early changes are likely to only cause additional engineering/
design hours. A later change, however, typically comes with changes
in prototyping tools and sometimes even production tools.
11While this is in accordance with the linear line on a logarithmic scale,
the factor 10 (opposed to any other real number) represents a heuristic.
Similar rules of thumb are also reported in development guidelines
within the company, as well as by other vehicle-producing companies
and even other industries.
12We observed one other case of duplication in one of the decisions
not reported in this article. In the absence of detailed user preference
data related to the ergonomics of the CCS interface, which was under
development by a marketing group, the team developed four different
interfaces concurrently.
13This is in line with Staudenmeyer (1999), who observes that inter-
dependence among design teams is mitigated by the architecture of the
system under development. Sometimes interdependencies can be min-
imized, using a modular product architecture, which—in general—
comes at the cost of reduced system performance (Ulrich 1995).
14Due to the high pressure needed to make air-intake prototype parts,
soft dies were not an option here.
15To keep development work from spiraling out of control, design
changes must be approved in a formal process. Long ECO leadtimes
result from a complicated formal approval process, combined with ex-
tensive paperwork, problem-solving responsibilities dispersed across
different groups, and congestion effects. In these cases, substantial
waiting times result, increasing the cost of rework (details of this part
of the study are reported in Loch and Terwiesch 1999).
16Examples of other, nongeometric, interdependences included noise
and vibration problems, problems in the assembly sequence, and prob-
lems with engine maintenance in the after-sales environment.
17This is related to Eisenhardt and Tabrizi 1995 and Terwiesch and
Loch 1999b, who distinguish between an experiential, iterative
problem-solving strategy and a highly structured strategy. The authors
report that in rapidly changing markets and technologies, structured
approaches are likely to fail.
18See, e.g., Bucciarelli (1994) for an ethnographic study of three en-
gineering projects that leads to new reflections on the dynamics of
technological choice. The study also creates a less rational and more
sociocultural picture of how engineering occurs.
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